By Mirabai Venkatesh
Mirabai Venkatesh is a first year MAIR student and Perspectives Editor studying security, strategy, and statecraft with a focus on East Asia.
Introduction
In 2015, under the leadership of President Obama, it seemed the United States was finally able to overcome challenges to ratifying a climate change treaty with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA). Rather than a formal international agreement requiring Senate ratification, the Paris Agreement is an executive agreement that does not bind the United States to substantial legal obligations, requiring no formal approval by the legislature. By reformatting the nature of international climate agreements, President Obama and his counterparts at Paris’ COP21 exchanged a system of legal obligations for one of pledge and review, wherein countries would make a pledge of progress and adhere to requirements of transparency and review as they advanced individually toward making good on these voluntary promises.[1] Yet, despite overcoming the hurdle of formal domestic ratification, the PA still succumbed to domestic pressure in 2017, when President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement and rolled back initiatives aimed at achieving the voluntary promises made by the United States under the PA.[2]
This piece will seek to explain why, despite seemingly overcoming domestic obstacles, the PA, like other climate agreements before, was abandoned by the United States in 2017 under the leadership of President Donald Trump. Through this analysis, the research in this paper will illustrate the powerful capacity of right-wing populism to undermine collective climate action on a global scale as it strategically seeks to manipulate domestic public opinion in a way that supports voluntary defection from international agreements and undermines cooperation on issues of development, climate, and sustainability.
Understanding the Right-Wing Populist at Home & Abroad
The key to explaining the failure of the Paris Agreement lies in understanding the political strategy of the right-wing populist. The right-wing populist’s agenda is two fold. On one level, the leader seeks to appear anti-elitist, an embodiment of the masses, and solidify their position in power by simultaneously fomenting fear and anger while positioning themselves as the solution. This is the public facing agenda of the right-wing populist. On another level, the right-wing populist usually also pursues their own elitist goals, taking actions that benefit themselves and their in-group.[3] The right-wing populist leader is prone to engage in “backlash politics,” which is best described by Karen Alter and Michael Zurn. Alter & Zurn describe backlash politics as combining three necessary elements— 1) a “retrograde” objective of promoting the return to a prior condition, 2) goals and tactics that challenge dominant narratives, and 3) a position in the mainstream public discourse. According to Alter & Zurn, when “backlash politics” combine with the catalysts of nostalgia, emotional appeals, taboo breaking, and institutional reshaping, the use of “backlash politics” can generate unpredictable consequences.[4] “Backlash politics'' can be considered the rhetorical framework upon which right-wing populist leaders like Donald Trump build their political platforms.[5] Trump’s “retrograde” objective was to “Make America Great Again,” a campaign slogan backed by policy positions that challenged the dominant narrative, made emotional appeals, evoked nostalgia, broke taboos, and earned him a share of the public discourse. Often, “retrograde” objectives are designed to trigger “in-group” and “out-group” sentiments among the public, making nostalgic emotional appeals more effective at mobilizing support. In addition, “backlash politics”' also involves stoking feelings of anxiety and fear, and then promising to relieve that anxiety by punishing the “out-group.” In short, right-wing populist leaders using “backlash” politics engage in classic scape-goating, as Trump did many times when it came to immigration and strategic competition with China.[6]
All of this serves to solidify domestic support and take attention away from contradictions in the right-wing populist’s platform and behavior, explain scholars Ziya Onis and Mustafa Kutlay. While the right-wing populist leader represents themselves as the embodiment of anti-establishment philosophy, much of their policy agenda is geared toward benefiting business elites above average citizens. Yet, right-wing populists like Trump manage to evade the consequences of their actions in the short-run by engaging in distraction tactics, which can play out through foreign policy. Onis and Kutlay argue that right-wing populist leaders deliberately pursue aggressive foreign policy agendas to both distract the public and inflict political costs on their opponents through rhetorical justification. Hawkish and uncompromising foreign policy positions offer right-wing populist leaders the perfect opportunity to both distract from their domestic contradictions while bolstering domestic support, as they appear to be punishing the unfair practices of foreign counterparts who represent a natural “out-group” to the general public.[7] Through their aggressive foreign policy, right-wing populist leaders additionally gain the opportunity to paint the status quo of international cooperation as a form of elitist collusion that prioritizes foreign interests over domestic ones.
Key theories that seek to explain the outcome of international negotiations focus on the concept of a “win-set,” or the acceptable outcomes to a given party in negotiations. In many ways, the “win-set” of both the chief negotiator (state leader) and the “win-set” of their domestic constituents defines whether negotiations will be successful by either restricting or expanding the common interests of those at the negotiating table. While, traditionally, the chief negotiator must balance the interests of both their domestic constituency and their international counterpart to achieve an outcome in their “win-set,”[8] the right-wing populist need only use the right amount of spin and distraction to achieve their “win-set.” Unlike the traditional chief negotiator whose “win-set” involves an outcome of cooperation, the right-wing populist rode to power on their use of “backlash politics,” and needs only to be seen as advancing their “retrograde” agenda and punishing parasitic “out-groups” to uphold and bolster support among their base.[9] They are then free to pursue their contradictory policy agenda and restructure institutions to make future political competition more favorable to them, a second critical component of their individual “win-set.”[10] This dramatically shifts the common assumptions that have historically underpinned diplomatic negotiation.
Observing the Right-Wing Populist: Trump & the Paris Agreement
On June 1, 2017, then-president Trump announced the U.S. would withdraw from the PA, citing his one and only duty to protect the American people as justification. Addressing the press, Trump said that the PA would cost the American people jobs, the American economy money, and the country its dominance on the world stage. He singled out China, who had played a central role in the adoption of the PA in 2015, painting the PA as yet another example of China taking advantage of the United States and promoting an uneven playing field that would disadvantage the average American.[11]
Most experts who predicted U.S. defection from the PA anticipated an involuntary defection due to opposition from formal ratification bodies such as the U.S. Senate. Since the 1990s, America’s ability to sustain international agreements addressing climate change had been rocky, with domestic politics often leading to involuntary defection from agreement after agreement.[12] Yet, Trump’s defection from the PA in 2017 cannot be considered an “involuntary defection,” a term which commonly refers to a situation where domestic opposition causes an international agreement to fail despite the desires of a country’s executive.[13] In 2016, at the outset of Trump’s presidency, 69% of registered voters supported the U.S. remaining in the PA, with 86% of Democrats and 51% of Republicans agreeing on the importance of America staying in the PA.[14] Thus, the PA succeeded on measurements of informal domestic ratification. Yet, Trump voluntarily defected from the agreement. According to prevailing theories of international negotiations, a voluntary defection should mimic the conditions of the prisoner’s dilemma or other collective action problems, and is undertaken to avoid disadvantages deemed more costly than the reputational consequences of defection.[15] However, this cost-benefit analysis based on imperfect information or collective action problems is not apparent in the case of Trump’s voluntary defection from the PA. Trump inherited an informally ratified PA that constrained the U.S. to no legal obligations. Facing no overwhelming costs from staying in the PA, Trump voluntarily defected from the PA not to avoid costs associated with imperfect information (prisoner’s dilemma) or collective action problems, but to reap domestic political benefits.
Trump adhered to the model of aggressive foreign policy expected of a right-wing populist leader, ignoring reputational costs, and veering away from traditional models of international negotiations.[16] These models, in many ways, rest on the underlying assumption that the chief negotiator’s “win-set” will be geared towards the achievement of an agreement.[17] Trump’s “win-set,” on the other hand, can be considered the United States’ exit from the PA. It could be argued that Trump did seek to negotiate a new climate agreement, or a new version of the PA, that imposed lower costs on the United States. However, this argument is undermined by Trump’s careless voluntary defection from the agreement. According to the stipulations of the PA, the United States was not allowed to exit the PA until four years after its adoption in 2020. Yet, Trump voiced U.S. exit in 2017, and then had to continue to have diplomatic meetings with PA members until he lost the election in 2020.[18] Knowing the credibility costs of voluntary defection, Trump withdrew from the PA anyways, undermining future agreements and international trust. Ultimately, Trump’s “win-set” of an untimely exit from the PA was not supported by the traditional rationale of a chief negotiator, but by his strategy as a right-wing populist. By exiting the PA, Trump gained a new marketing opportunity for his “retrograde” agenda where he was able to 1) push America in a more isolationist direction and 2) continue to invigorate domestic support by scape-goating China. Thus, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the PA not only adhered to his stated political ideology, but was also weaponized to embolden his base of supporters by reaffirming fear of status loss, anti-elitist sentiment, and strengthening “in-group” identity.[19]
Conclusion
Right-wing populist movements are, at the core of their ideology, about taking power from the “elite” and giving it back to the “people.” The leaders of right-wing populist movements are also likely to misrepresent their actual agendas, which commonly benefit a certain group of elites with shared business interests, using a combination of fear mongering, scapegoating, and ethnic nationalism to both distract the public and mobilize its support.[20] These two tendencies of right-wing populism combine to form a public facing platform that naturally opposes scientific and academic institutions and notions, promoting climate denial and in doing so benefiting the movement’s commercially elite supporters. Yet, there are more subtle mechanisms beyond the innate ideological opposition of the right-wing populist that serve to undermine global climate action.
The right-wing populist leader does not try to win-over a majority of domestic constituents. Instead, they try to transform the status quo through “backlash politics” and the manipulation of electoral rules to create an environment that will naturally facilitate their future political success regardless of the will of the majority.[21] This may lead to political failure in the long-run, yet can still substantially disrupt the landscape of international cooperation. Mikael Madsen, researching the impact of “backlash politics'' on international diplomacy, finds that international institutions and agreements are prone to fall victim to “backlash politics,” and that populist leaders are likely to rewrite the norms of international engagement to heighten the devastating impact of their “backlash politics” on international cooperation.[22] This can powerfully affect international climate agreements/working groups, which already suffer from resounding collective action problems and are highly dependent on the behavior of global hegemons. Scholars note that the international climate regime is highly dependent on the United States, for example, since the U.S. directly contributes to the collective good or bad as the world’s leading climate polluter, deeply linking other countries’ willingness to participate in agreements to levels of U.S. support.[23] Thus, when a right-wing populist leader like Trump assumes the role of America’s chief negotiator, this can lead to incredibly disruptive effects as the chief negotiator largely rejects common frameworks for international cooperation, engages in aggressive foreign policy approaches[24], and exits agreements like the PA heedless of reputational costs.
Ultimately, the rise of right-wing populism on both a global level and specifically in the United States has proved itself a true threat to climate action, as well as broader diplomatic cooperation and global collective action. Although, recently, right-wing populist leaders like Donald Trump seem to be falling from grace, it is important to note that right-wing populist movements have increased public support across Europe as of 2022[25], and many administrations including those of Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Italy, and India lean towards or fully embrace right-wing populism.[26] It will be important moving forward in our increasingly interconnected world to consider how right-wing populism both overtly and covertly undermines progress on a global level through both the patterns of behavior it inspires and the policy actions its movements use to both reframe and bypass public opinion.
PHOTO CREDIT: Michael Vadon licensed under CC BY 2.0.
References
[1] United States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2021. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11746.
[2] Roberts, Timmons. “One Year since Trump's Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement.” Brookings, June 1, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/one-year-since-trumps-withdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/.
[3] Onis, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox.” Taylor & Francis Online, March 18, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168?needAccess=true.
[4] Alter, Karen J, and Michael Zurn. “Conceptualising Backlash Politics: Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison.” Sage Journals, 2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148120947958.
[5] Onis, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox.” Taylor & Francis Online, March 18, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168?needAccess=true.
[6] Alter, Karen J, and Michael Zurn. “Conceptualising Backlash Politics: Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison.” Sage Journals, 2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148120947958.
[7] Onis, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox.” Taylor & Francis Online, March 18, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168?needAccess=true.
[8] Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” 1988. https://eclass.aueb.gr/modules/document/file.php/DEOS283/Negotiations%20and%20Bargaining%3A%20Institutional%20Context%20and%20BATNA/Diplomacy%20and%20Domestic%20Politics-%20The%20Logic%20of%20Two-Level%20Games.pdf.
[9] Alter, Karen J, and Michael Zurn. “Conceptualising Backlash Politics: Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison.” Sage Journals, 2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148120947958.
[10] Onis, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox.” Taylor & Francis Online, March 18, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168?needAccess=true.
[11] Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.” National Archives and Records Administration, June 1, 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
[12] Milkoreit, Manjana. “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change— Made in USA?” Cambridge University Press, 2019. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/4687F2B504D5984BA7F5299CA3878DBF/S1537592719000951a.pdf/div-class-title-the-paris-agreement-on-climate-change-made-in-usa-div.pdf.
[13] Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” 1988. https://eclass.aueb.gr/modules/document/file.php/DEOS283/Negotiations%20and%20Bargaining%3A%20Institutional%20Context%20and%20BATNA/Diplomacy%20and%20Domestic%20Politics-%20The%20Logic%20of%20Two-Level%20Games.pdf.
[14] Marlon, Jennifer, Eric Fine, and Anthony Leiserowitz. “Majorities of Americans in Every State Support Participation in the Paris Agreement.” Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, May 8, 2017. https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/paris_agreement_by_state/.
[15] Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” 1988. https://eclass.aueb.gr/modules/document/file.php/DEOS283/Negotiations%20and%20Bargaining%3A%20Institutional%20Context%20and%20BATNA/Diplomacy%20and%20Domestic%20Politics-%20The%20Logic%20of%20Two-Level%20Games.pdf.
[16] Onis, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox.” Taylor & Francis Online, March 18, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168?needAccess=true.
[17] Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” 1988. https://eclass.aueb.gr/modules/document/file.php/DEOS283/Negotiations%20and%20Bargaining%3A%20Institutional%20Context%20and%20BATNA/Diplomacy%20and%20Domestic%20Politics-%20The%20Logic%20of%20Two-Level%20Games.pdf.
[18] Roberts, Timmons. “One Year since Trump's Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement.” Brookings, June 1, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/one-year-since-trumps-withdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/.
[19] “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.” National Archives and Records Administration, June 1, 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
[20] Alter, Karen J, and Michael Zurn. “Conceptualising Backlash Politics: Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison.” Sage Journals, 2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148120947958.
[21] Onis, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Global Political Economy of Right-Wing Populism: Deconstructing the Paradox.” Taylor & Francis Online, March 18, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1731168?needAccess=true.
[22] Madsen, Mikael Rask. “Two-Level Politics and the Backlash against International Courts: Evidence from the Politicization of the European Court of Human Rights.” Sage Journals, September 9, 2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148120948180?journalCode=bpia&casa_token=vOs3l2xmZa4AAAAA%3A_mAQSn-sS1f6E_T6ehTTqY7BEXLm1YtuHC5cfVkRCdA0nQ3gVb00CWb5UEQFJVV3DJK7EWbhvXi_Ng.
[23] Milkoreit, Manjana. “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change— Made in USA?” Cambridge University Press, 2019. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/4687F2B504D5984BA7F5299CA3878DBF/S1537592719000951a.pdf/div-class-title-the-paris-agreement-on-climate-change-made-in-usa-div.pdf.
[24] Madsen, Mikael Rask. “Two-Level Politics and the Backlash against International Courts: Evidence from the Politicization of the European Court of Human Rights.” Sage Journals, September 9, 2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148120948180?journalCode=bpia&casa_token=vOs3l2xmZa4AAAAA%3A_mAQSn-sS1f6E_T6ehTTqY7BEXLm1YtuHC5cfVkRCdA0nQ3gVb00CWb5UEQFJVV3DJK7EWbhvXi_Ng.
[25] Silver, Laura. “Populists in Europe – Especially Those on the Right – Have Increased Their Vote Shares in Recent Elections.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, October 6, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/10/06/populists-in-europe-especially-those-on-the-right-have-increased-their-vote-shares-in-recent-elections/.
[26] Keating, Joshua. “The Global Wave That Trump Rode In on Carries on Without Him.” Slate Magazine. Slate, May 12, 2021. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/05/trump-putin-bibi-bolsonaro-right-wing-populism.html.